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THE COST OF FREE SPEECH: RESOLVING THE
WEDDING VENDOR DIVIDE
Victoria Cappucci*
As marriage equality becomes fully realized in the United States, business
proprietors increasingly refuse to service same-sex weddings on religious
grounds. However, at the same time, state laws protect same-sex couples
from discrimination in places open to the public. Such competing values
have resulted in a line of “wedding vendor” cases. As the cases continue to
proliferate, this Note examines when, and to what extent, the otherwise
equally important values of free expression and equality should trump one
another.
This Note analyzes First Amendment compelled speech claims within the
line of wedding vendor cases: specifically, whether wedding goods and
services are covered by the Free Speech Clause and, if so, what level of
scrutiny a court should employ to determine the constitutionality of an
antidiscrimination law. This Note demonstrates that patchiness within the
compelled speech doctrine and a lack of clear U.S. Supreme Court guidance
after Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission have
resulted in a “split” approach to resolving these issues. This Note ultimately
argues that if the vendors’ goods and services rise to the level of sufficiently
expressive conduct, then a court should apply intermediate scrutiny to an
antidiscrimination law incidentally burdening that conduct. In the
alternative, this Note provides a legislative solution to mitigate the tension
between religious liberty and equality.
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INTRODUCTION
[F]ew persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought
of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1

1. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
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Americans care equally about religious liberty and civic equality.2 Yet,
they are ambivalent as to when the former should trump the latter.3 That
indecision is mirrored in the law, further aggravating the social conflict.4 For
example, courts are hamstrung when tasked with balancing religious liberty
and marriage equality. Is it possible to resolve these competing values or are
they trapped in a zero-sum contest?
Barronnelle Stutzman, a wedding vendor, provides a timely illustration.
Ms. Stutzman is an elderly woman who owns a small flower shop in
Washington State.5 She lived a quiet life until the Washington attorney
general sued her in 2013 for discriminating against Robert Ingersoll and Curt
Freed, a same-sex couple.6 Ms. Stutzman declined to provide her floral
arrangements for Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Freed’s wedding because of her
religious beliefs.7 At the same time, Mr. Freed and Mr. Ingersoll had a
freestanding right to be free from discrimination under state law.8 The
conflict between the parties continuesMs. Stutzman has appealed the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court.9
The litigation concerning Ms. Stutzman, Mr. Freed, and Mr. Ingersoll is
representative of a larger line of “wedding vendor cases.”10 Such conflicts
are not going away11 because the religious liberty arguments pose perplexing
legal questions. Parties like Ms. Stutzman plead their cases on free speech
rather than free exercise grounds, arguing their goods and services are

2. See JOHN CORVINO ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 1
(2017); Where the Public Stands on Religious Liberty vs. Nondiscrimination, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/where-the-public-stands-onreligious-liberty-vs-nondiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/6DEY-8JVF].
3. See CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2 (“Isn’t everyone in favor of religious liberty, and
everyone against discrimination? Well, yes and yes, sort of.”); Douglas Laycock, The
Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 58 (2018).
4. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 58–60.
5. Broad Support for Floral Artist’s Freedom as Case Heads Back to US Supreme Court,
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/pressrelease-details/broad-support-for-floral-artist-s-freedom-as-case-heads-back-to-us-supremecourt [https://perma.cc/2BGD-G66K]; see also Alliance Defending Freedom, Meet Barronelle
StutzmanADF Case Story, YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=44jgKXnkJhU [https://perma.cc/5J3H-6AWA].
6. See Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 5.
7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1212–13 (Wash. 2019), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-333).
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333
(U.S. Sept. 11, 2019); see Barronelle Stutzman, Opinion, Barronelle Stutzman: Your
Religious Liberty Is in Danger if I Lose Mine in a Same-Sex Wedding Court Case, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/barronelle-stutzman-religious-libertysupreme-court [https://perma.cc/L6RN-62VK].
10. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (wedding cakes); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019)
(wedding videography); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 405 F. Supp. 3d 907 (D. Colo. 2019)
(customized wedding websites); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890
(Ariz. 2019) (wedding invitations); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016)
(wedding venue); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at 58.
11. Laycock, supra note 3, at 53.

2588

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

proxies for and expressions of their speech and should be protected as such.12
The outcome of these cases therefore depends on whether and to what degree
a reviewing court is willing to treat business activity as expressive speech.13
This Note analyzes two overarching issues integral to the line of wedding
vendor cases. First, whether commercial goods and services provided by
wedding vendors are indeed “expressive” under the First Amendment.
Second, if so, what is the appropriate level of scrutiny to balance the equities
on either side? The answers to these questions ultimately determine the
winner between two competing values: antidiscrimination and religious
liberty.
Part I provides the cultural and legal backdrop framing the speech issues
this Note examines. It explains how Supreme Court precedent leveled First
Amendment free exercise claims. Consequently, parties who conceptually
seek to freely exercise their religion must couch their claims in terms of free
speech under the compelled speech doctrine. Part II analyzes apposite cases
that conflict on whether wedding services and goods are speech under the
First Amendment and, if so, which level of scrutiny courts should apply to
review the challenged law. Part III suggests that when wedding proprietors’
goods and services satisfy the “inherently expressive test,” courts should then
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the challenged law passes
constitutional muster. Arguably, that two-part suggestion poses two hurdles
for the paradigmatic religious vendor. Accordingly, Part III recommends a
separate legislative solution to support the free exercise of religion.
I. THE RISE OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND THE FALL OF FREE EXERCISE:
A FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH PUZZLE
The wedding vendor cases are the product of two phenomenaprogress
for LGBTQIA+14 rights and concomitant restraint placed on the First
Amendment right to freely exercise religion. Part I.A suggests that
Obergefell v. Hodges15 launched the uptick in wedding vendor litigation by
aggravating cultural tensions between proponents of marriage equality and
those with religious objections to same-sex marriage. Part I.B examines case
law scrutinizing neutral laws of general applicability16 that, as applied,
burden First Amendment liberties such as religion and speech. In doing so,
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. This acronym stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning,
intersex, and ally or asexual. The plus sign indicates that the acronym is nonexhaustive.
Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html
[https://perma.cc/
9AX2-UVHF].
15. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
16. A neutral law of general applicability is one that “appears to be about a non-rightsimplicating matter of public health, safety, and the like,” rather than one suggesting that “the
state is up to some nefarious purpose.” Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop:
Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667, 672 (2019). In other words, the law does
not target a particular group, impose specific conduct, or aim to regulate a protected right like
religion.
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Part I.B points out that the wedding vendors discussed in Part II have every
incentive to plead their cases as compelled speech claims, instead of free
exercise challenges, because the former are given greater constitutional
latitude than the latter. Part I.C couples the analyses in Parts I.A and I.B
using Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission17 to
(1) highlight the issues raised in the wedding vendor cases, (2) note how the
Supreme Court ultimately dodged answering them, and (3) explain why
courts are invoking different modes of analysis in the case’s aftermath.
A. Marriage Equality and Religious Objectors: A Cultural and Legal
Dispute
The Supreme Court established the right to same-sex marriage in 2015.18
In Obergefell, the Court ruled that marriage is a fundamental right and applies
equally to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.19 Accordingly, Obergefell
obligated all fifty states to legalize same-sex marriage. In practice, the case
overturned same-sex marriage bans in thirteen states and vindicated samesex marriages in the remaining thirty-seven.20 Then President Barack Obama
declared the ruling a “victory for America.”21 In short, Obergefell ushered
in a new wave for LGBTQIA+ progressmarriage equality.
However, “[i]t’s as true in culture as it is in physics: [f]or any action, there
is an equal and opposite reaction.”22 After Obergefell, cultural objections to
same-sex marriage increased, in part out of concern for safeguarding
traditional beliefs concerning marriage and family life.23 Those cultural
objections have taken root in the growing line of wedding vendor cases.24
Accordingly, Obergefell heightened the friction between two rights: samesex marriage on one side and liberty to object vis-à-vis religious expression
on the other.
Being a more or less well-oiled machine, the Supreme Court immediately
harnessed that friction within the context of constitutional rights. In a pointed
17. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
18. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
19. Id. (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right
to marry.”).
20. Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Legal in All 50 States,
NPR (June 26, 2015, 10:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/
06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-all-states-must-allow-same-sex-marriages
[https://
perma.cc/G26X-GBBZ].
21. Id.
22. Emma Green, America Moved On from Its Gay-Rights Movementand Left a Legal
Mess Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2019/08/lgbtq-rights-america-arent-resolved/596287/ [https://perma.cc/V8AT-VD95].
23. See CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS
HISTORY 154 (2017) (“As the breadth of LGBT equality measures expanded, social and
religious conservatives began to sound the alarm about what that expansion meant for those
who morally object to same-sex sexual conduct and relationships.”); see also Green, supra
note 22 (“[P]ublic support for people refusing to serve LGBTQ people when it violates their
religious beliefs has crept up steadily: [a]lmost a third of Americans . . . say this should be
legal, compared with 16 percent . . . in 2014.”).
24. See supra note 10 (collecting recent wedding vendor cases).
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dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts highlighted the legal implications of the
majority opinion in Obergefell.25 Chief Justice Roberts discussed how the
ruling would constrain First Amendment rights to free exercise and speech.26
He also warned that “hard questions” would come to the Court after
Obergefell, “when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen
to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage.”27 In sum, Obergefell
set the stage for a reflection of growing cultural tensions in the
lawmarriage equality and the ability to realize that right versus religious
liberty to object under the First Amendment.
B. Neutral Laws of General Applicability and the First Amendment: An
Idiosyncratic Development
Although the legal tension raised in Part I.A implicates the First
Amendment right to free exercise,28 religious objectors in the wedding
vendor cases instead rely on a free speech claim to bring their cases to court.29
Considering a free exercise claim both intuitively and conceptually fits the
bill, why the First Amendment quirk?
1. The Not so Free Right to Exercise Religion: Employment Division v.
Smith and Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
In Employment Division v. Smith,30 the Supreme Court leveled the First
Amendment right to free exercise.31 In that case, members of the Native
American Church challenged Oregon’s criminal ban on peyote, claiming the
law interfered with their religious practices.32 The Court held that the Oregon
law, though it incidentally interfered with the right to free exercise, was
nevertheless constitutional.33 Smith set the precedent that when a law is
25. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2625 (“Today’s decision . . . creates serious questions about religious liberty.
Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith . . . spelled out in
the [First Amendment].”).
27. Id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”). As detailed, the First Amendment also contains anti-establishment,
free press, and free association protections. However, this Note will only address the
protections granted under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.
29. See infra Parts I.C, II (discussing the wedding vendors’ compelled speech claims).
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination
Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 103, 105 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (noting that Smith “leveled the ‘free
exercise’ of religion by making it subordinate to any governmental objective so long as it was
nominally rational and evenhanded”).
32. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
33. Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
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neutral and of general applicability—a law that regulates something other
than religion or a religious group yet, as applied, incidentally interferes with
a religious practice—a reviewing court ought to apply rational basis
scrutiny.34 In practice, Smith makes a free exercise claim unavailable to
aggrieved parties when a law incidentally burdens their religion because the
standard of review applied to the law is deferential.35 Pertinent to this Note,
the antidiscrimination laws challenged by the wedding vendors in Part II are
neutral laws of general applicability and, accordingly, Smith’s rational basis
is the standard in play.
In Smith, the Court exercised judicial restraint because it applied a lawfavoring, deferential level of scrutiny to give effect to the state’s policy
decision.36 The legal process school articulates that different branches of
government have different kinds of “institutional competence.”37 When a
nascent public policy issue surfaces, the best-positioned branch to resolve the
problem should, indeed, promulgate its solution.38 In the context of
“complex social problems,” the legislative branch is best suited to enact a
solution.39 Legislators can engage with and scrutinize the problem with a
holistic eye, whereas a judge can rule on the social issue only on a case-bycase basis.40 When a legislator does aim to rectify a social ill, the procedure
legitimizes the measure,41 and a reviewing court thus may be inclined to defer
to legislators to advance social policy.42 That said, the Smith Court upheld
Oregon’s statute banning peyote because it was concerned about the state’s
legitimate interest in banning narcotics.43

34. When a law conflicts with a constitutionally protected right, a court will use various
“levels of scrutiny” to determine whether the law is unconstitutional. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 564–68 (5th ed. 2015)
(discussing the origin, significance, and application of the levels of scrutiny). The review
boils down to two steps. First, the court determines the appropriate level of scrutiny, for
example, more deferential or demanding, which depends on whether the law indirectly or
directly burdens a constitutional right. Id. at 565. Second, the court applies that standard to
“scrutinize” (1) the interest the law serves and (2) how the law, in practice, achieves that
interest. Id. at 565–67. If the law satisfies the two prongs of the second step under the
applicable standard, it is constitutional. Id. at 568.
35. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. However, when a law targets a
particular religion, religious group, or practice—in other words, the law is not facially neutral
and of general applicability—the law is subject to strict scrutiny, a more demanding standard
of review. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993); infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
36. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–86. For discussion of rational basis as a less demanding
level of scrutiny, see Greene, supra note 16, at 667 n.3.
37. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lx (1994).
38. See id. at lx.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at liii.
42. Id.
43. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–86 (1990).
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Nevertheless, Smith is a highly controversial opinion.44 After the Supreme
Court handed down Smith, Congress, by a unanimous House and 97-3 Senate
vote, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199345 (RFRA),
which “prohibits the government from burdening religious exercise unless it
meets a high level of legal scrutiny.”46 Organizations across the political
spectrum championed the RFRA as reversing Smith to protect Americans of
all faiths.47 In practice, the RFRA “overturned” Smith by changing the
scrutiny analysis from rational basis to strict scrutiny, the most exacting
standard of review.48 Accordingly, the RFRA appeared poised to make it
substantially harder for the government to incidentally interfere with the right
to free exercise across the board.
However, shortly after its enactment, the Supreme Court held that applying
the RFRA to state action went beyond Congress’s power and that it was
unconstitutional as applied to states.49 Therefore, while the RFRA’s
application to a federal action stands,50 the Court left its holding in Smith
intact at the state level.51
In response, twenty-one states have adopted their own religious freedom
acts (“state RFRAs”),52 which are essentially identical to the RFRA.53 A
variety of believers, such as Sikhs, Apache, Muslims, and Jews have
successfully invoked the RFRA to overcome government-sanctioned barriers
to their religious practices.54 However, while state RFRAs gained traction in
44. See Dennis P. Hollinger, Religious Freedom, Civil Rights, and Sexuality: A Christian
Ethics Perspective, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON
GROUND 56, 58–59 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019) (“[Smith]
effectively asserts that a person can believe anything, but cannot necessarily live it out. In
other words, religious beliefs should be protected, but not the actions stemming from those
beliefs, for they are perceived to encroach on civil rights in a pluralistic society.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017 TermForeword: Rights as
Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 121 (2018).
45. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
and 42 U.S.C.).
46. Travis Weber, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs): What Are They
and Why Are They Needed?, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.frc.org/issuebrief/statereligious-freedom-restoration-acts-rfras-what-are-they-and-why-are-they-needed
[https://perma.cc/2DH6-QKM6] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
47. CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 16.
48. When a court applies strict scrutiny, it is often fatal to the challenged law because
burdens on constitutional rights must overcome a high bar. See, e.g., id. at 38–39.
49. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534–36 (1997).
50. See id. at 536.
51. Id.
52. This figure is current as of 2016. See generally STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACTS: A COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION
(William H. Manz ed., 2016); see also Weber, supra note 46.
53. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Information Central, BECKET L.,
https://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/rfra-info-central/
[https://perma.cc/LKK4WARV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (noting that a successful RFRA claim must satisfy three
requirements: (1) the complaining party has “a sincere belief that is being substantially
burdened” and (2) the government does not have a compelling interest that interferes with the
belief or, if it does, (3) the measure substantially burdening the religious belief is not the least
restrictive means).
54. See CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 17.
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the 1990s–2000s, they have received severe negative press suggesting that
they target same-sex marriage.55 Following this federalism tug-of-war, a free
exercise claim is “unavailable” to a burdened party in a state that has not
enacted its own religious freedom act because a law incidentally burdening
religion will receive deference. In popular media, religious freedom acts
today stand as a cultural flashpoint.56
2. Free Speech and the Compelled Speech Doctrine: An Overview
With a federal free exercise claim a dead end, an aggrieved party has every
incentive to couch their First Amendment claim within free speech, a “classic
trump.”57 The touchstone of free speech is personal autonomy, which is a
fundamental right.58 This fundamental right is multifaceted.59 The right to
speak equally covers the right to refrain from speaking.60 The right to refrain
from speaking, in part, prevents the harms of unwanted expression,
association, endorsement, and attribution to promote personal autonomy.61
The compelled speech doctrine, a subset of free speech jurisprudence,
explicitly protects the right to refrain from speaking.62 As reflected in the
55. Id. at 17–18 (discussing the strong opposition of national sports leagues, musicians,
and business leaders to Indiana’s proposed religious freedom act in 2015 as a product of
political timing in the wake of marriage equality).
56. Id. at 19; see In the News: What RFRA Is Really About, ALLIANCE DEFENDING
FREEDOM, https://adflegal.org/detailspages/faith-and-justice-details/what-rfra-is-really-about
[https://perma.cc/7YFV-5E4T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
57. Greene, supra note 44, at 36. However, not all words, creative forms, or modes of
expression fall within “Free Speech Clause territory.” Greene, supra note 16, at 677
(discussing whether expression is covered by the Free Speech Clause, i.e., whether it is
sufficient to bring the First Amendment into play). For further discussion on the difference
between speech, its corollaries, and what falls into the Free Speech Clause’s ambit, see Leslie
Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of Speech,” 116 MICH. L. REV.
667, 686–93 (2018) (“‘[S]peech’ refers to a phenomenon in the world . . . . The phrase ‘the
freedom of speech’ is a term of art, one that does not track people’s [colloquial] understanding
of the word ‘speech.’ . . . [I]t excludes some forms of ‘speech’ (insider trading, etc.) and it
includes some nonspeech (music, abstract art, flag burning, etc.).”). See also Caroline Mala
Corbin, Speech or Conduct?: The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J.
241, 270 (2015) (“A very expansive category of [expressive conduct] also risks diluting
potential protection for that category.”).
58. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 37 (2008) (“[F]ree speech is
an inherent right which is rooted in human dignity and autonomy.”).
59. See id. (explaining that free speech “give[s] rise to other fundamental rights, including
personal security, privacy, reputation, citizenship, and equality” (emphasis added)).
60. Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1475, 1480 (2018).
61. See id. at 1494 (“Connecting or associating me with unwanted messages is a harm to
my ability to construct my self in part through my expressive acts. It affects both how the
world sees me and how I see myself.” (emphasis added)).
62. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invalidating a New Hampshire
law making it a misdemeanor to obscure the state motto “Live Free or Die” on noncommercial
license plates). “[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against
state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all.” Id.; see also, e.g., Nat’l. Inst. Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376–
78 (2018) (holding that a state law requiring health clinics to post notices about low-cost and
free abortions compels speech); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
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seminal case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,63 the
compelled speech doctrine aims to restrict the government from foisting
unwanted messages, ideologies, beliefs, or statements onto people.64 The
compelled speech doctrine, in part, prevents the harm of connecting to,
associating with, or otherwise attributing to a person a particular idea to
which that person otherwise would not ascribe but for the threat of legal
sanctions.65 Thus, the compelled speech doctrine gives people the right to
choose which messages are, and are not, “made in their name.”66
Barnette and its progeny stand for the proposition that when the object of
a law is to impose speech, the measure is subject to strict scrutiny.67 The
reason being that a facial mandate of speech effectively “alters the content of
the speech.”68 When a law is on the books to function “as a content-based
[speech] regulation,”69 it is inherently pernicious70 and a demanding level of
scrutiny is thus warranted.
However, when the purpose of a law is to oblige something other than
speech, yet as applied it incidentally burdens speech,71 the standard of review
is less clear.72 Part of the confusion, and relevant to the wedding vendor
cases, stems from the question of whether the contested good, service, or
activity is “expressive” enough to bring a free speech analysis into play.73
To sort out those queries in the wedding vendor cases detailed in Part II,
courts analogize to one of two compelled speech cases: Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.74 or Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).75

(invalidating a state law mandating students to salute the flag and state the pledge of
allegiance).
63. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
64. Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
65. Greene, supra note 16, at 683.
66. See Greene, supra note 60, at 1478 (discussing the freedom of disassociation).
67. See Greene, supra note 16, at 672.
68. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (holding
state-mandated sponsorship disclosures unconstitutional).
69. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding a
state law requiring newspapers to provide political candidates a “right of reply”
unconstitutional)).
70. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (discussing the
crucial nature of free dissemination of ideas).
71. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing whether activity is sufficiently
expressive to warrant a free speech analysis); see also infra Part III.
72. As in the free exercise realm, the Supreme Court also distinguishes between laws that
facially compel speech and those that are neutral and of general applicability. See PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980) (collecting cases). However, as this
section explains, the Supreme Court’s precedent guiding the level of scrutiny analysis for
facially neutral laws, within the context of a free speech claim, is murky.
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
75. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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In Hurley, the Supreme Court held a “peculiar”76 application of a state
antidiscrimination law77 was unconstitutional under the compelled speech
doctrine.78 Here, St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers refused to allow GLIB,
an Irish, gay affinity group in Boston, to participate in the parade as a
sponsor.79 The Court reasoned that an application of the challenged law in
this context would foist a message onto the parade that the council had
“clearly decided to exclude.”80 Further, the Court stated that the law would
require the “speakers to modify the content of their expression,”81 violating
“the general rule of speaker’s autonomy.”82 The Court found the law
unconstitutionally compelled the organizers’ expression even though it was
facially neutral.83
Although the antidiscrimination law burdened expression incidentally, the
Court arguably treated the law as if it facially compelled expression.84
Hurley does not explicitly engage in a level of scrutiny analysis.85 Yet, the
case proposes that when an application of an otherwise neutral law treats
“speech itself to be the public accommodation,”86 a more exacting standard
of review like that deployed in Barnette should apply.87
The Court likely protected the organizers’ speech so vigorously for two
reasons. First, the Court was concerned about such a broad application88 of
a public accommodations law, which traditionally covers inns, theaters, and
other similar places open to the public.89 It discussed at length that a parade
is of such an “expressive character”90 that treating the parade itself like a

76. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
77. The plaintiffs challenged a public accommodations law that prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2020). A public
accommodations law is a state measure aiming to regulate places open to the public, like an
inn, theater, or restaurant. See BALL, supra note 23, at 200. Thus, a public accommodations
law is a neutral law of general applicability. Id.
78. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581.
79. Id. at 561.
80. Id. at 574.
81. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. (“On its face, the object of the law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians
desiring to make use of public accommodations . . . they will not be turned away.”).
84. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
85. See Greene, supra note 16, at 675 (“Hurley does not mention levels of scrutiny. Once
the Court determined that the ‘peculiar’ application of the state law would require the
organizers to alter their parade message, the case was over.”).
86. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
87. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
88. See BALL, supra note 23, at 200 (noting that a parade is not a public accommodation
in the traditional sense and so applying an antidiscrimination law in that context is arguably a
reach).
89. Id. (“The controversy in Hurley initially arose because of the broad reach of the state’s
public accommodation law as interpreted by the state courts. It can be argued that private
parades should not be included within the scope of civil rights statutes.”).
90. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
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public accommodation was improper.91 The Court explained the organizers
did not wish to exclude members of GLIB from attending the parade; rather,
they wanted to exclude GLIB as a “parade unit carrying its own banner.”92
The distinction is subtle but important. The Court seemed to imply that if
the organizers did not allow GLIB members to attend the parade at all, unlike
other members of the Boston public, they would violate the
antidiscrimination law.93 However, the organizers could exclude GLIB from
the live, expressive activity occurring within the parade itself, i.e., the parade
proper.94 The Court deemed the state’s application of the antidiscrimination
law in this context illegitimate because it regulated the parade proper instead
of regulating the public’s access to the parade.95 Second, the Court engaged
in a brief, yet telling, discussion describing a parade as a quintessential mode
of expression protected by the First Amendment.96 The Court compared a
parade to a “protest march”97 and its organizers to an archetypical political
activist “who takes to the street corner to express his views.”98 Compelling
the organizers to express GLIB’s message would be equally
unconstitutional.99 Therefore, the parade organizers won the case, despite
the antidiscrimination law being facially valid.100
In FAIR,101 the Supreme Court held that the Solomon Amendment—a
federal law that required law schools to host military recruiters on campus—
did not compel the schools’ speech.102 Congress passed the Solomon
Amendment in direct response to schools restricting the military’s access to
on-campus recruiting because of the schools’ disagreement with the
military’s official “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.103 Although the Solomon
Amendment did not facially regulate the schools’ speech, the case presented
a strong argument that it did as applied because the schools would have
refused hosting the recruiters but for the superseding law. A “stepped-up”104
91. Id. at 572 (“[T]he Massachusetts law has been applied in a peculiar way.”); see
Greene, supra note 16, at 677 n.47 (discussing more strategic and intuitive ways
Massachusetts could have held the organizers liable).
92. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
93. See id. at 578.
94. Id. (“When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its
apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to
whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own.”).
95. Id. at 573.
96. See id. at 577–79.
97. Id. at 577.
98. Id. at 579.
99. Id.; see BALL, supra note 23, at 200 (“[The Court] determined that it was reasonable
to believe that members of the public would perceive GLIB’s participation in the parade as
resulting from the council’s support for, or approval of, the gay group’s message.” (emphasis
added)).
100. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
101. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
102. Id. at 51. The Solomon Amendment required schools to “offer military recruiters the
same access to its campus and students that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving
the most favorable access” in order to receive federal funding. Id. at 55.
103. Id. at 55.
104. See Greene, supra note 16, at 673.
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review could have been applied in light of Hurley. However, the Court
rejected that notion.
Instead, the Court reasoned that, as a threshold matter, the schools’
“expressive” activity did not rise to the level of constitutional speech or
expression.105 The Court ruled that hosting military recruiters does not
compel literal “speech.”106 Although school officials communicated with the
recruiters via email, the Court refused to treat administrative emails as First
Amendment protected speech.107 Further, the Court stated the government
can limit “speech” when it facilitates conduct that the government has the
authority to regulate.108 The Court found that the incidental compelled
speech elements of the case in FAIR were a “far cry” from Barnette and its
progeny.109
Next, the Court addressed Hurley’s implications when a law incidentally
imposes on expression. The Court acknowledged that sufficiently expressive
conduct could warrant First Amendment protection under the compelled
speech doctrine.110 At that point in its opinion, the Court could have deferred
to precedent, Hurley, and found that the Solomon Amendment compelled the
schools to convey an unwanted message.
Instead, the Court declined to treat the schools’ activity as expressive at
all.111 The Court borrowed from the “symbolic speech” lines of cases to test
whether the schools’ implicated activity was expressive enough to bring free
speech in play.112 Relying on the seminal cases United States v. O’Brien113
and Texas v. Johnson,114 which involved draft-card and flag burning
respectively, the Court defined quintessential “symbolic speech.”115 The
Court ruled that when conduct is “inherently expressive,”116 meaning the
conduct conveys an “overwhelmingly apparent”117 message, it is entitled to
First Amendment protections.118
105. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 62 (reasoning that protecting such emails under the First Amendment would
trivialize the freedom protected in Barnette and its progeny).
108. Id. “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on
the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading
‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the
employer’s speech rather than conduct.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 63 (“Our compelled-speech cases are not limited to the situation in which an
individual must personally speak the government’s message.”).
111. Id. at 65.
112. See id. (“Having rejected the view that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly
regulates speech, we must still consider whether the expressive nature of the conduct regulated
by the statute brings that conduct within the First Amendment’s protection.”).
113. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
114. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
115. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406). In determining whether a message is
“overwhelmingly apparent,” a court should consider “the context in which it occurred.”
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
118. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.
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Applying those principles to the facts in FAIR, the Court concluded that
the Solomon Amendment did not violate the First Amendment because the
schools’ conduct was not sufficiently expressive.119 The Court reasoned that
schools’ decision to host the military or not did not send the clear message
that the schools agreed or disagreed with the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy.120 The Court rejected the schools’ argument that, because the schools
intended to express a message through their conduct, the Court should protect
that conduct as First Amendment expression.121 The Court reasoned that an
intent to express does not warrant free speech protection; rather, a clear
message must follow the intention, which the schools lacked.122 The Court
resolved the case on the threshold question of whether the activity was speech
or otherwise expressive conduct but did not engage in a level of scrutiny
analysis.123
The compelled speech doctrine has two implications when a law
incidentally burdens speech, expression, or expressive conduct. First, the
case law provides a guidepost to determine when a form of expression is
sufficient to fall within the First Amendment’s coverage.124 Second, the case
law suggests two tiers of scrutiny may be applicable when a law incidentally
interferes with expressive conductHurley may suggest an exacting
standard of review,125 whereas FAIR may suggest something more
deferential,126 like the intermediate scrutiny employed in O’Brien and
Johnson. This Note suggests that the distinction between the cases is the
nature of the governments’ interest. In FAIR, the Solomon Amendment was
linked to the government’s ability to raise a military, an arguably strong
119. Id.
120. Id.
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the law school has
no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its disapproval of the
military, all the law school’s interview rooms are full, or the military recruiters
decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace else.
Id.
121. Id. at 66–67.
122. Id. (noting that O’Brien states that an intent to express a message does not itself
necessitate a free speech analysis); see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”
(emphasis added)).
123. If the schools’ activity did satisfy the inherently expressive test of expressive conduct,
the Court would have applied intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Intermediate scrutiny is a less demanding standard than strict scrutiny. See Greene, supra note
16, at 672. The Court applies a more deferential standard because the government has a “freer
hand” in restricting “expressive conduct”; it involves speech and nonspeech elements, the
latter of which are not explicitly protected under the First Amendment. Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
124. Compare FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65–67 (applying expressive conduct case law), with
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577–79 (1995)
(discussing pure, classic expression).
125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
126. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. “[W]e have limited the applicability of O’Brien’s
relatively lenient standard to those cases in which ‘the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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However in Hurley, the broad reach of the public
interest.127
accommodations law colored, and thus weakened, the government’s interest
in preventing discrimination.128
The issues of when conduct is sufficiently expressive to fall into the First
Amendment’s coverage and the applicable standard of review foreground the
highly contested line of wedding vendor cases.
C. Masterpiece CakeshopFree Exercise Is Born Again Under Compelled
Speech
As religious objection met the realization of marriage equality, the line of
compelled speech claims from wedding vendors began to proliferate.129
Those cases proposed several perplexing First Amendment questions. First,
are wedding goods and services expressive? Are they so expressive as to
invoke the First Amendment? If the wedding vendor’s various activities are
sufficiently expressive under the First Amendment, would holding the
vendors in violation of antidiscrimination laws when they refuse service for
same-sex weddings compel their speech? If yes, which standard of review
would apply to the antidiscrimination laws, given that they are facially
neutral public accommodations laws? When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,130 the Court seemed primed to answer these questions.131
The facts in Masterpiece Cakeshop were representative of the broader line
of wedding vendor cases.132 Here, Jack Phillips owned and operated
Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado.133 Charlie Craig and Dave
Mullins, a gay couple, visited the bakery to place an order for their wedding
cake.134 Mr. Phillips refused the request on religious grounds.135
Subsequently, Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins filed a complaint with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, the reviewing body tasked to review charges of
antidiscrimination, against Mr. Phillips and his bakery.136 Mr. Craig and Mr.
127. See supra note 102 (discussing the Solomon Amendment).
128. See supra notes 88–91 (discussing the broad, “peculiar” application of the
antidiscrimination law to the parade).
129. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (involving a
wedding photographer who refused services for a lesbian couple’s wedding); Gifford v.
McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) (involving wedding venue owners who refused
to host a lesbian couple’s wedding); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051
(Or. Ct. App. 2017) (involving a bakery owner who refused to take a wedding cake request
from a lesbian couple), review denied, 363 Or. 224 (2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019).
130. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
131. See id. at 1723. (“The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation
of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to
protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face
discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment . . . .”).
132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1723.
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Mullins claimed Mr. Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act
(CADA), which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation
and lists “sexual orientation” as a protected category.137 After a lengthy
appeals process, the case made its way to the Supreme Court. The issue of
whether a wedding cake is sufficiently expressive to trigger a compelled
speech analysis took up the most “briefing space”138 on appeal.139
Though the issues outlined above were ripe for review, the Court “found
itself an exit ramp.”140 Instead of deciding the case on the merits, the Court
held the record made by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission was infected
with religious animus in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, reversing the
case for Mr. Phillips.141 The Court took issue with three instances of
religious hostilitytwo sets of statements made by members of the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission142 and the commission’s different treatment of Mr.
Phillips as compared to other bakers, who the Commission held could refuse
to bake cakes on conscience grounds.143 The Court concluded that “cases
like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts,
all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with
tolerance.”144 In short, Masterpiece Cakeshop stands for the proposition that

137. Id. at 1725.
138. See Greene, supra note 16, at 667.
139. Mr. Phillips argued the Free Speech Clause should protect his cake production because
the cakes were a form of artistic expression that reflected his personal celebration of a
marriage. Brief for Petitioners at 12–14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
Mr. Phillips concluded that the CADA mandated the content of his expression and, relying on
Riley, would fail under strict scrutiny. Id. at 19; see supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text
(discussing Riley). In contrast, the government argued intermediate scrutiny should apply, at
most, because the CADA regulates Mr. Phillips’s discriminatory conduct, posing an incidental
burden on his “expression.” Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 17–
18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
140. Greene, supra note 44, at 122.
141. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (“When the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the
Constitution requires.”).
142. The first two involved specific statements made by members of the commission. The
Court described the first: “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe’ but cannot act on
his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’” Id. at 1729. In the second
instance the commissioner stated: “[R]eligion has been used to justify all kinds of
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust . . . we
can list hundreds of situations . . . . [I]t is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric . . . .”
Id.
143. Id. at 1730. The Court noted that in prior cases, the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission held that bakers did not violate the CADA when they refused to create cakes that
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, a conscience-based objection inversely
analogous to that of Mr. Phillips. Id. However, in those cases, the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission reasoned the bakers did not discriminate against the customer because the bakers
would still provide other goods, like birthday cakes and cookies, to the customer. Id. Yet, the
Court found the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not apply that favorable rationale to
Mr. Phillips. Id. Instead, the commission applied a new rule—Mr. Phillips’s refusal was an
act of discrimination and not an exercise of religious objection because the requested cake
would carry Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins’s message. Id.
144. Id. at 1732.
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a reviewing body, there, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, must
impartially decide cases implicating religious liberty.145
Notably, however, Justice Clarence Thomas went on to analyze the free
speech aspect of the case in his dissenting opinion.146 First, Justice Thomas
ruled Mr. Phillips’ cake making was sufficiently expressive conduct to bring
the First Amendment into play because wedding cakes are inherently
symbolic.147 Then, Justice Thomas analogized the case to Hurley by
comparing the symbolism of wedding cakes to that of parades, finding a
demanding level of scrutiny applies to the CADA.148 Justice Thomas did not
decide whether the CADA would satisfy strict scrutiny.149 However, Justice
Thomas advised that an individual’s adherence to a minority view is a strong
reason to give the individual even greater protection.150 He specifically
noted that Mr. Phillips was in the minority post-Obergefell.151 Justice
Thomas’s analysis is important because lower courts have relied on it to
resolve wedding vendors’ free speech claims by treating the vendors’ goods
or services as speech and then fatally apply strict scrutiny to the
antidiscrimination law.152
Nevertheless, Masterpiece Cakeshop could have helped resolve the
tension between religious liberty and marriage equality but frankly did very
little to offer clear, precedential guidance.153 As detailed in Part II, the
wedding vendor cases continue to arise. Without Supreme Court
guidance,154 the lower courts are employing different modes of analysis and
are coming to opposite conclusions despite analogous facts. In light of the

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1742–47 (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 1742–43.
148. Id. at 1744.
149. Id. at 1746.
150. Justice Thomas’s reasoning echoes that of the “famous footnote” four of United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34,
at 565 (noting that footnote four advises courts to apply varying levels of review depending
on the constitutional assertion). “[A] ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it
is . . . a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular minority.’” Id. (quoting Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
151. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that courts
should not deploy the First Amendment to criticize views and should apply the First
Amendment to protect different views); see supra Part I.A (discussing Obergefell and its
cultural implications).
152. See infra Part II.A.
153. See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom,
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 750 (2019) (“Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision.
The case turns on rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between our antidiscrimination laws, on the one hand, and our commitment to religious freedom, on the other.
But the narrowness of the case’s holding is deceptive. In fact, Masterpiece Cakeshop reflects
very broad cultural and political trends that drive those conflicts and shape their
resolution . . . .”).
154. But see supra note 146 (discussing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion). Part II
suggests some courts are taking up Justice Thomas’s analysis by first treating goods and
services as speech and then applying strict scrutiny to the antidiscrimination law.
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petition for certiorari docketed for State v. Arlene’s Flowers Inc.,155 the
“dodge”156 made in Masterpiece Cakeshop “won’t work for long.”157
II. TWO COMPETING PARADIGMS: PURE SPEECH AND STRICT SCRUTINY
VERSUS SUFFICIENTLY UNEXPRESSIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Masterpiece Cakeshop highlights two crucial but unresolved First
Amendment issues in the line of wedding vendor cases. First, is business
activity that arguably has expressive elements sufficiently expressive to fall
within the Free Speech Clause? Second, if so, how should a presiding court
review a facially neutral antidiscrimination law that, as applied, incidentally
burdens vendors’ expression? The first question is a threshold inquiry and a
crucial analytical step for a presiding court. The second question guides
courts in balancing the equities of antidiscrimination and religious liberty visà-vis expression. Part II.A provides two cases where the courts find vendors’
activities to be speech and then apply strict scrutiny. In those cases, the
antidiscrimination laws did not pass constitutional muster. Part II.B provides
a third case, representative of a split from those cases discussed in Part II.A,
where the court more closely scrutinized the vendor’s activity and did not
find it to be “speech” at all. Accordingly, the court did not reach the second
balancing portion of the inquiry.
A. Compelled “Pure” Speech and Strict Scrutiny
This section examines two cases decided after Masterpiece Cakeshop,
which represent one approach courts take to resolve a compelled speech
claim in the wedding vendor cases. First, the courts have treated the vendors’
services as pure speech, not expressive conduct or unexpressive business
activity. Then, tracking Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, they have applied strict scrutiny to the challenged
antidiscrimination law.158
This two-step analysis has yielded one
paradigmatic side in the wedding vendor divide.159
1. Telescope Media Group v. Lucero
In Telescope Media Group v. Lucero,160 the Eighth Circuit held that
wedding video producers have a right to provide their services to oppositesex couples only.161 Here, Angel and Carl Larsen, who own Telescope
Media Group (“Telescope”), a for-profit Minnesota corporation, sought to
155. 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19333).
156. Greene, supra note 44, at 122.
157. Id.
158. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1742–46 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); supra note 146 (discussing Justice Thomas’s
expressive speech analysis).
159. See supra Part II.B (examining the second paradigm).
160. 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019).
161. Id. at 754.
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enjoin the government from enforcing pertinent provisions of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act162 (MHRA) against them. The Larsens challenged the
MHRA provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation163 because they wanted to begin producing wedding videos but
for opposite-sex couples only.164 As devout Christians, the Larsens
characterized their faith as requiring them to carry God’s message in all they
do165 and they intended to promote Christian ideals166 in the wake of
marriage equality.167 The Larsens conceded the videos would initially be
inspired by their clients’ ideas, but their own creativity and editorial decisions
produced the final message.168 In short, the Larsens argued the MHRA laws
would compel them to speak favorably for same-sex weddings when they
could not in good conscience.169
Although the MHRA is a facially neutral public accommodations law, the
court found that it was unconstitutional as applied to the Larsens in two steps.
First, the court ruled the Larsens’ wedding videos were pure speech170
covered by the First Amendment.171 To support that ruling, the court
reasoned that the wedding videos would be sufficiently expressive to bring
the First Amendment into play because the Larsens wished to shape public
discourse about marriage through the videos.172 The fact that the Larsens’
videos were not “feature films”173 was inconsequential.174 The court rejected
the government’s argument that the videos would be commercial conduct
162. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.11(1)(a)(1), 363A.17 (2020).
163. Id. Section 363A.11 of the MHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in places open to the public: “It is an unfair discriminatory practice: (1) to deny
any person the full and equal enjoyment of [goods and services] . . . of a place of public
accommodation because of . . . sexual orientation.” Id. § 363A.11. Section 363A.17 of the
MHRA equally prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in business settings: “It is an unfair
discriminatory practice for a person engaged in a trade or business . . . to intentionally refuse
to do business with . . . [a person because of their] sexual orientation.” Id. § 363A.17.
164. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750.
165. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 8, Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d 740 (No. 17-3352).
166. Id. at 9.
167. See id. at 8 (“The Larsens witnessed the cultural redefinition of marriage with concern.
They have seen the debate and want to take part in that public dialogue. The Larsens want to
tell stories through their films of marriages between one man and one woman that magnify
God’s design and purpose for marriage.”).
168. Id. at 24.
169. Id.
170. Pure speech is distinct from expressive conduct or symbolic speech. See supra notes
122–24 and accompanying text (noting that the First Amendment protects literal speech more
vigorously than expressive conduct or speech).
171. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 750 (“[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is
included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First [Amendment].” (quoting
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952))).
172. Id. at 751.
173. Id.
174. In contrast, the dissenting opinion took issue with the majority’s treatment of the
wedding videos as First Amendment protected films, rather than services offered to the public.
Id. at 776 (Kelly, J., dissenting). In support, the dissent distinguished the Larsens’ services
from those of filmmakers whose films are conventionally thought of as First Amendment
protected speech. Id. at 775 (“[The Larsens’] counsel compared them to ‘Steven
Spielberg’ . . . . But Steven Spielberg is not a public accommodation . . . .”).
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falling outside the First Amendment’s coverage.175 Accordingly, in rejecting
the government’s argument and ruling for the Larsens, the court reasoned
that if the Minnesota government applied the MHRA to Telescope to require
the company to provide film services equally to same-sex and opposite-sex
couples, then it would be compelling the Larsens’ speech.176
Next, the court reviewed the MHRA under strict scrutiny, creating an
exception for the Larsens’ business activity.177 The court reasoned that
“[l]aws that compel speech” warrant strict scrutiny, meaning the MHRA
would have to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
that interest.178 The court relied heavily on Hurley to apply strict scrutiny,179
instead of another level of review, as suggested in FAIR.180 The court noted,
“the [Supreme] Court drew the line exactly where the Larsens ask us to here:
to prevent the government from requiring their speech to serve as a public
accommodation for others.”181 In appealing to Hurley, the court found the
MHRA “regulate[d] speech itself,” going “too far.”182 Therefore, it
concluded that the MHRA did not pass constitutional muster because “as
compelling as the interest in preventing discriminatory conduct may be,
speech is treated differently,”183 and so the MHRA must yield to the First

175. Id. at 752 (majority opinion) (“To be sure, producing a video requires several actions
that, individually, might be mere conduct: positioning a camera, setting up microphones, and
clicking and dragging files on a computer screen. But what matters most . . . is that these
activities come together to produce . . . ‘medi[a] for the communication of ideas.’” (quoting
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952))). Compare id., with Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M 2013) (ruling that wedding photographs
were products effectuated by an “ordinary public accommodation” and constituted business
conduct falling outside the First Amendment’s coverage).
176. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 752 (noting that the MHRA “compels the Larsens
to speak favorably about same-sex marriage if they choose to speak favorably about oppositesex marriage”).
177. Id. at 759–60.
178. Id. at 754 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)). Though
the court principally relied on Hurley for that position, the court also cited to the line of cases
in which the courts applied strict scrutiny to challenged laws that facially compelled or
regulated speech. See id. at 753 (discussing content-based speech regulations). Note, however,
the Supreme Court draws lines between the facial and incidental compulsion of speech, the
former triggering strict scrutiny and the latter not necessarily so. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
179. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 754. In contrast, the dissenting opinion argued
that intermediate scrutiny should apply to the case for two reasons. Id. at 776 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting). First, the MHRA does not facially regulate speech. Id. Second, the MHRA, as
applied, interferes with expressive conduct, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny under
O’Brien: “[A] regulation of conduct does not become a regulation of content . . . . Laws with
merely incidental effects on expression are subject to intermediate scrutiny.” Id. (citing United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)).
180. Id. at 758 (majority opinion) (“The facts of the case, as pleaded by the Larsens, are
much closer to Hurley than to . . . F.A.I.R.”).
181. Id. at 755.
182. Id. at 758. The court seems to suggest that, under Hurley, when a facially neutral law,
as applied, compels speech ex post, it is on par with a law that regulates speech ex ante. See
supra note 178 and accompanying text. This Note addresses the blending of compelled speech
and regulation of speech in the section below.
183. Telescope Media Grp., 936 F.3d at 755.
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Amendment. The Eighth Circuit thus held the MHRA was unconstitutional
as applied to the Larsens because it could not survive strict scrutiny.184
2. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix
In Brush & Nib, LC v. City of Phoenix,185 the Arizona Supreme Court,
relying in part on the analytical framework set forth in Telescope Media
Group, held that wedding invitation designers have a right to provide their
customized services to opposite-sex couples only.186 Here, plaintiffs
Breanna Koski and Joanna Duka, who own Brush & Nib Studio, LC (“Brush
& Nib”), sought to enjoin the Phoenix government from enforcing provisions
of the Phoenix City Code (PCC),187 which would prevent Brush & Nib from
establishing a same-sex couple “refusal policy.”188 Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski
challenged the PCC provisions that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in public accommodations.189 They argued that, as
Christian artists, they “must honor God”190 using their talents. Accordingly,
Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski would only accept requests that they believed
conveyed messages in line with their religious convictions.191 Ms. Duka and
Ms. Koski also argued that the customized invitations expressed their views;
while they initially collaborate with a client to form the basis of the invitation,
the final product relays their own vision.192 Accordingly, Ms. Duka and Ms.
Koski claimed that applying the PCC to their business would compel their
speech by requiring them to alter their message that marriage is between a
man and a woman.193
The court held that the relevant portions of the PCC unconstitutionally
compelled Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s speech in two steps.194 First, the court
found the Free Speech Clause sufficiently covered Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s
customized invitations as “pure speech.”195 The court reasoned that state and
federal precedent have treated “written and spoken words” and “original
artwork” as speech.196 Because the custom wedding invitations “contain[ed]
184. Id. at 758.
185. 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
186. Id. at 909–10.
187. PHX., ARIZ., CITY CODE § 18-4(B)(2)–(3) (2019).
188. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 899. Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski sought to (1) refuse
requests for same-sex weddings and (2) publish a statement of their policy to that effect. Id.
However, only the first request is pertinent to this Note because it involves an analysis of
whether Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s goods are protected speech. Published statements online
presumably are speech.
189. PHX., ARIZ., CITY CODE § 18-4(B)(2)–(3) (“No person shall, directly or indirectly,
refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person . . . accommodations . . . because of . . . sexual
orientation . . . .”).
190. Appellants Opening Brief at 1, Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d 890 (No. 1 CA-CV 160602), 2017 WL 1113222, at *1.
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id. at *7–8.
193. Id. at *9.
194. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 916.
195. Id. at 908.
196. Id. at 905–07 (collecting cases).
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[Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s] hand-drawn words, images, and calligraphy, as
well as their hand-painted images and original artwork,” the invitations
themselves were “pure speech.”197 Further, the court rejected the
government’s argument that the invitations were analogous to the
unexpressive conduct in FAIR198 because of Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s
intimate connection with and artistic control over the invitations.199 The
court concluded the first part of its analysis by stating that the invitations
were neither flat logistical blocks of text nor fungible goods but, rather, were
“designed to express a celebratory message about each wedding.”200
Accordingly, the court ruled the invitations functioned as Ms. Duka and Ms.
Koski’s speech201 and that to apply the PCC to their business would
effectively compel their speech.
In the next portion of the opinion, the court invoked Telescope Media
Group to apply strict scrutiny to the PCC.202 The court relied on Telescope
Media Group’s application of Hurley,203 ruling the PCC “must”204 satisfy
strict scrutiny because the city’s application of the law “declare[d] Plaintiffs’
197. Id. at 908.
198. In rejecting the analogy to FAIR, the court stated:
This case bears no resemblance to FAIR. Here, Plaintiffs’ custom wedding
invitations, and the creation of those invitations, constitute pure speech . . . . In
contrast, FAIR was not “intimately connected” with the empty interview rooms on
their campuses, nor was it compelled to create emails containing words, phrases,
and artwork celebrating the military’s presence on campus.
Id. at 909. However, the dissent aligned with the government’s argument and, notably, the
line of reasoning adopted in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 65 (N.M. 2013).
See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 932 (Bales, J., dissenting) (“[W]edding invitations may
be expressive, [but] the operation of a business catering to the public is not.”).
199. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 908.
200. Id.
201. Id. In contrast, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that the invitations could not
be Ms. Duka and Ms. Koski’s “pure speech” because any celebratory message is effectively
intercepted and conveyed by the engaged couple when they send the invitations: “[T]he
expression of a wedding invitation, as ‘perceived by spectators as part of the whole’ is that of
the marrying couple.” Id. at 933 (Bales, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995)).
202. However, the opinion takes Telescope Media Group’s scrutiny analysis one step
further. The court conflates the compelled speech doctrine with speech regulation case law:
[W]e must first decide what level of scrutiny applies to the [PCC]. This requires us
to examine whether the [PCC] is a content-neutral or content-based regulation of
speech . . . . When a facially content-neutral law is applied by the government to
compel speech, it operates as a content-based law.
Id. at 912–13 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Instead of appealing to Hurley’s
suggestion that a facially neutral law should be subject to strict scrutiny and moving on, the
court leveled the compelled speech doctrine by treating laws that facially compel speech and
incidentally burden speech as one in the same. However, the Supreme Court has instructed
otherwise. See supra Part II.B. The dissenting opinion highlighted this flaw, taking issue with
the majority’s treatment of the PCC as a measure that functions to regulate speech. The
opinion notes that the PCC facially regulates discrimination, not speech, an important
distinction to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 934
(Bales, J., dissenting).
203. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 913–14 (discussing Hurley as “instructive” and
the scrutiny analysis in Telescope Media Group as within the same line of reasoning).
204. Id. at 914.

2020]

THE COST OF FREE SPEECH

2607

‘speech itself to be the public accommodation.’”205 The court concluded that
the measure failed under strict scrutiny because it neither served a compelling
interest nor was it narrowly tailored.206 Accordingly, the court held for Ms.
Duka and Ms. Koski, excepting their business activity from the PCC.
Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio stand for two main
propositions. First, the cases set the precedent that wedding vendors’ goods
and services are speech, though the opinions execute their speech analyses
differently. Second, the cases rule that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review for determining whether antidiscrimination laws, though
facially neutral towards speech, violate the First Amendment. Together, the
cases represent one side of the division in the wedding vendor line of cases.
B. Neither Speech nor Conduct as Speech: State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.
Standing on the other side of the wedding vendor dividing line is State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.207 In contrast with Telescope Media Group and Brush
& Nib Studio, in Arlene’s Flowers, the Washington State Supreme Court
decided Ms. Stutzman’s compelled speech claim at the threshold. The court
held the sale of floral wedding arrangements was not speech.208 Ms.
Stutzman owns Arlene’s Flowers, a small flower shop in Washington, where
she designs floral arrangements for customers with three other floral
designers.209 She is an active member of her church and sincerely believes
“marriage can exist only between one man and one woman.”210 When
Robert Ingersoll, a Washington resident and repeat customer of Arlene’s
Flowers, spoke with Ms. Stutzman at her store to request floral arrangements
for his wedding to Curt Freed, Ms. Stutzman denied Mr. Ingersoll’s request
on religious grounds.211 Mr. Ingersoll left the interaction feeling dejected.212
Ms. Stutzman then implemented an unofficial policy of rejecting requests for
same-sex weddings.213 After the Washington State attorney general learned
about that interaction, the state government commenced suit against Ms.
205. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 572–73 (1995)).
206. Regarding a compelling interest, the court cites to Telescope Media Group v. Lucero,
936 F.3d 740, 755 (8th Cir. 2019), stating that even if the government argues that the PCC
serves the compelling interest of eradicating discrimination, it is not sufficiently compelling
when it captures speech. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 915. Regarding the law being
narrowly tailored, the court reasoned that “because the purpose of the [PCC] is to regulate
conduct, not speech, regulating Plaintiffs’ speech is not narrowly tailored to accomplish this
goal.” Id.
207. 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19333).
208. Id. at 1225.
209. Id. at 1211.
210. Id.
211. Id. Notably, Mr. Ingersoll and Ms. Stutzman did not discuss logistics of the wedding,
such as the type of flowers or floral arrangements he sought or whether the store would deliver
the arrangements to the wedding location. Accordingly, Ms. Stutzman’s blanket rejection
occurred before she knew how personally involved she would be in the event.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1212.
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Stutzman pursuant to the Washington Law Against Discrimination214
(WLAD), a public accommodations law. Ms. Stutzman asserted that
applying the antidiscrimination statute to her would “impermissibly”215
compel her to speak in favor of same-sex marriage, in violation of her First
Amendment right to free speech.216 She contended her floral arrangements
are speech under the First Amendment because the arrangements express her
unique artistic ability.217
However, Ms. Stutzman did not convince the court of her argument for
two reasons. First, the court ruled that neither the creation of floral
arrangements nor the floral arrangements themselves are literal speech
covered by the First Amendment.218 Then, the court invited the possibility
that the floral arrangements could be expressive “conduct as speech”219
covered by the First Amendment. However, the court ruled that Ms.
Stutzman’s conduct did not satisfy the requisite conduct-as-speech
standard.220
To determine whether Ms. Stutzman’s conduct was speech (i.e., expressive
conduct), the court applied the “inherently expressive test,” invoked in
FAIR.221 The court stated two conditions must be satisfied for conduct to be
sufficiently expressive to implicate the First Amendment: “[(1)] [a]n intent
to convey a particularized message was present, and [(2)] in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.”222 The court explained that to pass the second
prong,223 strong intention and personal involvement are not enough; rather,
the conduct must be “clearly expressive, in and of itself, without further
explanation.”224
In determining whether Ms. Stutzman satisfied the second prong, the court
appealed to FAIR and distinguished the presented facts from those in
Hurley.225 As in FAIR,226 the court reasoned one of several messages could

214. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2020) (“It shall be an unfair practice for any
person . . . to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction,
or discrimination . . . or the refusing or withholding from any person the . . . patronage . . . in
any place of public [accommodation] . . . [on the basis of] sexual orientation . . . .”).
215. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1224.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1224–25.
218. Id. at 1225 (“We agree [with the State] that the regulated activity at issue in this
caseStutzman’s sale of wedding floral arrangementsis not ‘speech’ in a literal sense and
is thus properly characterized as conduct.”).
219. Id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)).
220. Id.
221. Id.; see supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text (discussing the inherently
expressive test).
222. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)).
223. Although the opinion does not explicitly say so, Ms. Stutzman arguably satisfied the
first prong of the test. Id.
224. Id. at 1227 (collecting cases).
225. Id. at 1226.
226. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
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be implicated by Ms. Stutzman’s refusal policy.227 Thus, a reasonable
observer could not conclude that Ms. Stutzman rejected Mr. Ingersoll’s
business because it implicated her views against same-sex marriage. The
court then addressed Hurley’s implications for expressive conduct: “Hurley
is therefore unavailing to Stutzman: her store is the kind of public
accommodation that has traditionally been subject to antidiscrimination
laws.”228 It did not find Ms. Stutzman’s business conduct on par with the
inherent expressiveness of a parade.229 The court concluded that Ms.
Stutzman’s conduct was not inherently expressive and failed to implicate the
Free Speech Clause.230 Therefore, Ms. Stutzman was ultimately held liable
under the WLAD.231
In response, Ms. Stutzman has filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.232 Ms. Stutzman urges the Court to rule that her floral arrangements
are covered under the First Amendment.233 In support, she continues to argue
that her floral arrangements constitute “artistic expression,” invoking Hurley
to support the proposition that the First Amendment grants protections
beyond the written or spoken word.234 In the alternative, Ms. Stutzman
contends that the Washington Supreme Court erred in its application of the
“inherently expressive” test because the floral arrangements are expressive
in and of themselves; the court should not have focused on whether her
refusal sent a particular message.235
Ms. Stutzman concludes that the WLAD unconstitutionally compels her
speech because the law fails under strict scrutiny. Directly citing to
Telescope Media Group, she argues strict scrutiny applies to the WLAD
because it functions to regulate her speech content.236 Also relying on
Telescope Media Group, she insists the WLAD fails under strict scrutiny
227. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1226. (“[A]n outside observer may be left to wonder
whether a wedding was declined for one of at least three reasons: a religious objection,
insufficient staff, or insufficient stock.”).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1226–28.
230. Id. at 1228. Because the Free Speech Clause was not implicated, the court did not
need to engage in a scrutiny analysis.
231. Id. at 1237. Ms. Stutzman also asserted state and federal constitutional violations of
her free exercise and associational rights. However, the Washington Supreme Court also
dismissed those claims:
[T]he WLAD may be enforced against Stutzman because it does not infringe any
constitutional protection. As applied in this case, the WLAD does not compel
speech or association. And assuming that it substantially burdens Stutzman’s
religious free exercise, the WLAD does not violate her right to religious free
exercise under either the [Washington or U.S. Constitutions] because it is a neutral,
generally applicable law that serves our state government’s compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination in public accommodations.
Id.
232. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9.
233. Id. at 7.
234. Id. at 27–30.
235. Id. at 29 (“[Stutzman’s] claim is that her custom wedding art is itself expressive, not
simply that the act of declining to create it is expressive.”).
236. Id. at 32–33.
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because the law neither serves a compelling interest nor is narrowly
tailored.237
The arguments Ms. Stutzman briefed in her petition for certiorari track the
analysis set forth in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio. The
Washington government continues to argue her business conduct should not
be protected by the First Amendment.238 Thus, the First Amendment issues
of (1) whether wedding goods and services are “speech” and (2) if so, which
level of scrutiny should apply to a neutral law incidentally burdening that
speech are once again posed at the Supreme Court level.
III. ADJUDICATORY AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE WEDDING
VENDOR CASES
As the speech and scrutiny questions implicated by the wedding vendor
cases remain ripe for review, this Part suggests that a presiding court should
resolve the disparities in wedding vendor case precedent as follows. Part
III.A.1 suggests that a presiding court should apply the “inherently
expressive test”239 employed in Arlene’s Flowers to resolve the threshold
issue of whether a given vendor’s service is covered by the First Amendment.
Part III.A.2 suggests that if a wedding vendor’s business activity passes the
inherently expressive test, the court should apply intermediate scrutiny to the
challenged law.
However, because Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2 pose two hurdles to a party
aggrieved on religious grounds, Part III.B suggests a legislative alternative
for those who feel religiously burdened when providing services for samesex weddings. It first suggests that the wedding vendors’ religious interests
are best vindicated through free exercise claims. However, with Smith still
applicable at the state level,240 aggrieved parties could turn to their state
legislators to propose a religious freedom act241 or small business exception
to public accommodations laws.
237. Id. at 33–34 (“Relying on this Court’s free-speech cases like Hurley, the Eighth Circuit
held that ‘regulating speech because it is [allegedly] discriminatory or offensive is not a
compelling state interest, however hurtful the speech may be.’ . . . Besides the absence of a
compelling interest, the State also fails strict scrutiny because it can pursue its goals by
narrower means without infringing Barronelle’s First Amendment rights.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 755 (8th Cir. 2019))).
238. Without explicitly conceding that the floral arrangements are covered under the First
Amendment, the government has replied that Ms. Stutzman’s flowers might be expressive but
the WLAD does not regulate that expression. State’s Brief in Opposition at 20, Arlene’s
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2019). Rather, the government
argues, the WLAD regulates Ms. Stutzman’s act of refusing service for a same-sex wedding,
which seems to suggest the government is dodging the speech question to focus the Supreme
Court on what the WLAD regulates in practice. See id. The government contends the WLAD
does not direct Ms. Stutzman as to how she should create her floral arrangements but, rather,
regulates her discriminatory business decisions. Id.
239. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19-333).
240. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that Smith renders a federal First Amendment free
exercise claim a dead end).
241. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing federal and state RFRAs).
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A. A Two-Part Conciliatory Adjudicative Framework: The Inherently
Expressive Test and Intermediate Scrutiny
This section proposes that courts should adopt the inherently expressive
test promulgated under Arlene’s Flowers242 to resolve the threshold speech
inquiry in the wedding vendor cases. If the test is satisfied, this section then
proposes courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to the challenged
antidiscrimination law.
1. The Inherently Expressive Test Is the Appropriate Standard to
Determine Whether Wedding Goods and Services Are Speech
The inherently expressive test aims to sort out whether a vendor’s business
activity is sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection.243
Expressive conduct will warrant constitutional protection if two requirements
are met: (1) there was intent to convey a particularized message and (2) in
the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.244
In analyzing the second prong of the inherently expressive test, a
reviewing court should consider two primary factors. The first factor, as
elaborated Arlene’s Flowers,245 is whether a reasonable person would
perceive a particular message when a vendor provides or refuses service or,
rather, one of many. That factor has direct support under Supreme Court
precedent.246 A second factor is whether a reasonable person receiving or
viewing the vendor’s good or service would understand the message to be
that of the vendor or, rather, the married couple.247 This factor is arguably
more dispositive than the first. The compelled speech cases prevent, in part,
the harms of unwanted association, attribution, and endorsement,248 so
linking the message back to the vendor is crucial if it is to be treated as his or
her speech. Thus, if a reasonable person perceives a particular message as
flowing from the vendor, then the vendor’s good or service is arguably
expressive conduct under the Free Speech Clause.
In practice, the inherently expressive test will serve as a tool to separate
meritorious speech claims from those that would dilute the meaning of

242. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225–28.
243. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
244. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d at 1225 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410–11 (1974) (per curiam)). It is likely that the wedding vendors would satisfy the first
requirement because they tend to plead their cases with conviction and particularity. However,
satisfaction of the second prong would hinge on whether the final product is susceptible to
varied interpretations (with FAIR’s line of reasoning as a guidepost) or is so expressive that
the end user needs no additional explanation (with Hurley’s line of reasoning as a guidepost).
245. Id. at 1226.
246. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
247. For support of this proposition, see supra note 201 (discussing attribution in the
wedding vendor cases). See also CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 89.
248. See Greene, supra note 60, at 1494.
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speech.249 The test is appropriate to determine the threshold “speech” issue
in the wedding vendor cases from both fairness and precedential
perspectives. This section will detail three specific reasons to that effect.
First, the test acknowledges the goods and services for what they
areproducts of the wedding vendors’ commercial conduct that also have
expressive elements.250 Treating the goods and services as “pure speech,” as
in Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio, or as completely
unexpressive business conduct251 is too far afield from that reality. These
cases are perplexing because the vendors are in creative lines of business.252
From a fairness perspective, the test balances two competing intereststhe
wedding vendors’ potential speech liberties and the government’s interest in
regulating commercial conduct. The test is reasonable because it reflects
both the interests at stake and the reality that the vendors’ activities are not
clear-cut.
Second, the inherently expressive test is a pragmatic standard that courts
can apply. While the courts will decide on a case-by-case basis which
activities rise to the level of expressive conduct as speech, a clear standard
will create more consistency among similarly situated vendors. The test
provides a clear guidepost, which removes the temptation to outright rule,253
or to weave together various speech cases254 to conclude that products are
“pure speech.” If courts were to uniformly apply the inherently expressive
test, parties could better regulate their conduct ex ante instead of speculating
how a given court might rule after the fact.
Third, the test provides an analytical check to determine which speech
claims should properly pass through the courts. O’Brien instructs that not all
conduct is sufficiently expressive to bring the First Amendment into
playspeech is not synonymous with “intent” or “creativity” because speech
must send a message.255 Ultimately, reliance on Arlene’s Flowers is more

249. See Corbin, supra note 57, at 370 (noting that to treat anything colloquially understood
as speech or expression would dilute the right to freedom of speech).
250. See supra notes 218–19; see also Greene, supra note 16, at 678 (“The arguments
against custom wedding cake baking as expressive are first-order and second-order. The firstorder argument is that such a baker is just running a business, fulfilling customer demand,
producing cakes as if he were producing any other good. But the argument cannot be that he
is producing cakes as if he were producing widgets, because the whole point of a made-toorder business (or part of a business) is that the goods aren’t fungible.”).
251. See, e.g., supra notes 198, 218, 238 and accompanying text (discussing that the
Phoenix, New Mexico, and Washington State governments have frequently argued the
wedding vendors’ activities are nonexpressive business conduct).
252. See Greene, supra note at 16, at 678.
253. See supra note 171.
254. See supra note 196.
255. See supra note 122.
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faithful to free speech case law256 and the right itself257 than reliance on
Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio. The former scrutinizes the
message received, whereas the latter two draw artificial speech lines.258 The
test centers on an inquiry into whether the withheld service evokes a
particular message flowing from the proprietor, not whether the service has
blanket expressiveness or creativity. The Supreme Court has drawn “speech”
lines in the past, illustrated by O’Brien, ultimately, to preserve the right
altogether.259
2. If Wedding Goods or Services Pass the Inherently Expressive Test, the
Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny
If a good or service were to pass the inherently expressive test,
intermediate scrutiny should apply260 for three reasons. First, the test aims
to sort out which conduct is sufficiently imbued with speech elements to be
covered by the First Amendment. When speech and nonspeech elements fuse
into the same course of conduct, O’Brien and its progeny are guiding
precedent.261
Second, an alternative to intermediate scrutiny could be strict scrutiny, as
suggested by Telescope Media Group and Brush & Nib Studio, which
primarily invoked Hurley.262 However, appealing to O’Brien and its progeny
better aligns with the structure of the wedding vendor cases given their
blending of speech and nonspeech elements.263 Further, the analogy to
Hurley does not wash. Hurley involved a “peculiar” application of an
In the wedding vendor cases, public
antidiscrimination law.264

256. As discussed in FAIR, the inherently expressive test concerns whether a reasonable
person observing the activity would think the activity is expressing a particular message when
taken in context, not whether the activity has expressive elements. Freedom of speech and
expression protects a message actually conveyed, not an intention to convey a message.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66–67 (2006); see
supra note 122.
257. See supra Part I.B (discussing the right to free speech).
258. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
259. See Corbin, supra note 57, at 270.
260. For expert support on this suggestion, see id. at 281 (observing that in the line of
wedding vendor cases, the antidiscrimination laws compel “expressive conduct, and therefore
would be subject to the intermediate scrutiny of O’Brien rather than the strict scrutiny of
Barnette and Wooley”). See also Greene, supra note 16, at 676 (“If an iteration of Cakeshop
returns to the Court, the Court similarly should apply O’Brien as true intermediate scrutiny.”).
261. See supra note 124.
262. See supra note 85.
263. See supra note 123; see also Corbin, supra note 57, at 281. Additionally, the Eighth
Circuit’s and the Arizona Supreme Court’s treatments of the antidiscrimination laws as
content-based regulations to later invoke cases applying strict scrutiny is arguably askew. See
supra notes 178, 202, 203. Within the compelled speech cases, the Supreme Court
distinguishes between facial and incidental speech burdens whereas those courts have blurred
that distinction to apply a demanding standard of review. See supra note 72. Thus, their strict
scrutiny discussions are less persuasive from a precedential perspective.
264. See supra note 88.
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accommodations laws are conventionaltheir activities are unlike parades
because they are registered businesses open to the public.265
Third, given the liberties at stake, intermediate scrutiny more adequately
weighs the interests on both sides instead of closing the case from the
outset.266 An antidiscrimination law will pass intermediate scrutiny if (1) it
furthers “an important or substantial governmental interest,” (2) is enacted
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” and (3) the “incidental
restriction [it poses] on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”267 The three-pronged
intermediate scrutiny test is designed to leave room for a duly enacted law
that advances a clear social purpose. The very language of the test accounts
for important governmental purposes, recognizes that the purpose may come
into conflict with another important right, and allows a judge to resolve the
competing interests on a case-by-case basis. Strict scrutiny, on the other
hand, is often fatal in practice to a challenged law.268 Intermediate scrutiny
aligns with the idea that when a complex social issue is implicated, though
the Court has the power to analyze a constitutional question, it should
consider the legislator’s choice to advance a particular policy.269 In the
wedding vendor cases, that means a policy choice favoring marriage equality
over the ability to speak freely in opposition. Thus, applying intermediate
scrutiny would strike a balance between rational basis and strict scrutiny in
weighing the merits on either side of the wedding vendor dispute.
B. A Legislative Alternative: State RFRAs and Small Business Carve-Outs
With the approach laid out above, pleading a free speech claim may seem
like a high bar to clear for the paradigmatic religious vendor because the
vendor must first satisfy the inherently expressive test and then defeat the
government against the backdrop of intermediate scrutiny. This section
offers an alternative legislative solution, which could bear fruit more readily
than bringing a free speech claim to court, especially given that the line of
wedding vendor cases might not be an exact fit for vindication of free speech
to begin with.270
265. Even if proprietors enter the wedding business as a mode of expressing their beliefs,
as discussed above, an intention to express a message or to engage in creative activities is not
enough to bring activity into the free speech ambit.
266. Strict scrutiny is conventionally rights-favoring and, as indicated in Hurley, is a
frequent dead end for the government. Rational basis is conventionally government-leaning
and, as indicated in Smith, is a frequent dead end for the individual.
267. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Arguably, an antidiscrimination
law will satisfy the first prong because eradicating discrimination is a compelling interest and
unrelated to regulating speech. Conceivably, an antidiscrimination law could fail under the
third prong.
268. See supra note 48.
269. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
270. See Greene, supra note 44, at 121 (“Phillips refused to bake the cake for Craig and
Mullins not because he was an artist but because he was a Christian. A freedom of religion
frame would have set the issues in the terms in which the litigants actually experienced
them . . . .”).
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Affected individuals could rally their municipal or state legislators to
propose a religious freedom act or an exemption to a public accommodations
law. This alternative is a modest271 and democratic one. The public votes
for legislators, whereas judges are frequently appointed by executive
officials.272 Yet, judges effectively make policy decisions about religious
liberty and antidiscrimination with the stroke of a pen when deciding whether
to hold for a wedding vendor.273 If a community is unsatisfied with their
elected officials’ policy choices, it can vote them out of office. Judges, on
the other hand, are often tenured.274 When inhabitants of a judicial district
are dissatisfied with the outcome of a highly contested wedding vendor case,
they do not have the same recourse as they would if the decision were made
through legislative channels.
State and local legislators are best suited to make policy decisions about
difficult social issues as a function of their law-making role.275 When a
complex social issue implicates constitutional rights on one side and the
advancement of antidiscrimination measures on the other, legislators’
institutional competence positions them to discern the appropriate balance.276
A legislator has an eye to resolve such complex issues holistically, whereas
a judge must decide ad hoc.277 Further, constituents generally have more
faith in local officials than in federal officials to adequately represent
them.278 Presumably, then, if constituents lobbied local officials to enact a
form of legislation, subsequent legislative inaction could reflect a policy
choice to bolster marriage equality in light of contemporary values of
LGBTQIA+ progress.279 Conversely, if a state or municipality were to enact

271. The Court could overrule Smith to change the standard of review for a free exercise
claim. However, this section assumes the validity of Smith and suggests a local legislative
solution as a more modest step than overruling Supreme Court precedent.
272. Federal judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate and hold
office for life. State judges may be elected, but they may also be appointed for a term of years
or for life. Comparing Federal & State Courts, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/court-role-and-structure/comparing-federal-state-courts
[https://perma.cc/
4SEP-WZ4N] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
273. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that Obergefell overturned a swath
of state laws on the ground).
274. See supra note 272.
275. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 368 (2009) (noting that a legislator
“prioritize[s] constituent preferences” for “salient” policies). Further, elected officials have
readily responded to infringements on religious liberty upon the judicial branch handing down
a controversial ruling. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the RFRA as Congress’s response to
the Court’s ruling in Smith).
276. See supra notes 37–42.
277. See supra notes 37–42.
278. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PUBLIC, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 18 (2018), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/04/426-2018-Democracy-release-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMQ5-NBQN].
279. See State Legislative Policymaking in an Age of Political Polarization, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/About_State_
Legislatures/Partisanship_030818.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS9J-VQJJ] (“Policymaking is the
process of making laws. . . . The converse of policymaking is gridlock: the inability of
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specific legislation for religious liberty, an aggrieved party would be
vindicated through a more intuitive280 and democratically legitimate channel.
A legislative solution on the state level could take the form of a religious
freedom act that simply mirrors the RFRA.281 Though they may have fallen
out of favor due to the political climate in 2015,282 legislators should not treat
them with hostility. The RFRA has protected the rights of inmates,
government employees, and churchgoers.283 When placed in context with its
purpose, and out of politics, a state RFRA can similarly do much good in
promoting the free exercise of all religions.
Within the religious vendor context, a state RFRA would thus require
vendors to show that a public accommodations law substantially burdens
their religion.284 If the vendor adequately pleaded that burden, the reviewing
court would apply strict scrutiny to the challenged law.285 Though strict
scrutiny might seem draconian for antidiscrimination laws,286 a religious
freedom act modeled after the RFRA spreads the burden between the
religious vendor and the government: the vendor must show that the
challenged law infringed on a central religious practice or belief.287
Arguably, that pleading requirement would cut through trivial religious
exercise claims.
If a state RFRA is too much of an overhaul, a small business carve-out
within a public accommodations statute could suffice. That exemption
would be narrow, mainly covering proprietors who are personally involved
in daily business production.288 The “exemption” could be capped for
businesses of no more than roughly five employees.289 That number aims to
cover vendors who would have no choice but to engage with the particular
project to which he or she objects.
An ex ante legislative solution to the wedding vendor divide provides a
procedurally legitimate resolution of conflicting values of religious liberty
and marriage equality. Instead of an ex post case-by-case judicial solution,
a legislative one would reflect a democratic policy choice to either give
religious liberty greater latitude or not, as marriage equality is fully realized.
legislators . . . to reach an agreement or pass a law . . . .”); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 37, at lxxix (discussing government inaction as a rejection of a particular policy end).
280. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (describing the RFRA).
282. See supra note 55.
283. See supra note 54.
284. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a successful
RFRA claim).
285. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 266.
287. See supra note 53.
288. For further discussion of small business exceptions and attempts to legislate them, see
Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 648–655 (2015).
289. This section suggests five employees, considering the wedding vendors discussed in
this Note generally run their businesses as one- or two-person operations. The exemption
would not cover a larger business because, arguably, an objector could pass the project along
to another employee.
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CONCLUSION
The wedding vendor cases reflect broader social values that deeply affect
Americansreligion and equality. Given how divisive those values are
when pitted against one another, clear judicial guidance on how to balance
the First Amendment issues at stake is necessary. In the meantime, an
alternative, up-front legislative resolution might be prudent.

